Victory Chronicles
-DAY 244

Above: Enemy flags in the dirt. (New York Times)

• The Kremlin intensified its information operation to accuse Ukraine of preparing to conduct a false-flag attack using a dirty bomb for a second day in a row on October 24.
• Russian forces conducted air, missile, and drone strikes against targets in Ukraine at a markedly slower tempo than in previous days. The slower tempo of Russian air, missile, and drone strikes possibly reflects decreasing missile and drone stockpiles and the strikes’ limited effectiveness of accomplishing Russian strategic military goals.
• Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate Chief Major General Kyrylo Budanov claimed that Russian forces have used most of their cruise missile arsenal and only have 13 percent of their pre-war Iskander, 43 percent of Kaliber, and 45 percent of Kh-101 and Kh-555 pre-war stockpiles left, supporting ISW’s prior reports on dwindling Russian precision-guided munition stockpiles.
• Budanov stated that Russia’s dwindling supply of cruise missiles is forcing the Russian military to rely on Iranian drones but that Iranian suppliers only send 300 drones per shipment and that the drones take a long time to manufacture. Budanov stated that Ukrainian air defenses shoot down 70 percent of all Shahed-136 drones, including 222 of the 330 Russia has used so far.
• Budanov stated that Kremlin elites largely did not support Putin’s decision to annex Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk Oblasts prior to securing those territories, prompting many officials to contact their Western counterparts to express their disinterest in continuing the war in Ukraine. Budanov claimed that some Kremlin officials began advocating for negotiations with Ukraine to their Western counterparts while the Russian military-political command plotted missile strikes to scare Ukrainians into negotiations.
• Russian milbloggers reported that Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continues to accrue power and is setting up a military structure parallel to the Russian Armed Forces, which may come to pose a threat to Putin’s rule – at least within the information space. Prigozhin is sponsoring the formation of a Wagner-based volunteer battalion recruited by a Russian war criminal and former Federal Security Service officer Igor Girkin.
• Racism and bigotry continue to plague the Russian Armed Forces, increasing the likelihood of ethnic conflicts.
• Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit announced the completion of the construction of two reinforced defense lines on the border with Ukraine on October 23 — likely an act of security theater designed to target a domestic Russian audience since there is no danger whatsoever of a Ukrainian mechanized invasion of Russia.
• Hurried Russian mobilization efforts to fix personnel shortages on the front lines have cannibalized the Russian force-generation staff and diminished Russia’s ability to effectively train and deploy new personnel and to staff domestic industries.

Above: New York Times

• Liquidated personnel, 68,420 (+480)
• Tanks, 2,611 (+21)
• Armored personnel vehicles, 5,321 (+26)
• Artillery systems/MLRS 1,674/377 (+1/2)
• Anti-aircraft warfare systems, 190 (+1)
• Aircraft/helicopters, 271/248 (+1/3)
• UAV operational-tactical level, 1,372 (+2)
• Cruise missiles, 350 (0)
• Warships/boats, 16 (0)
• Vehicles and fuel tanks, 4,054 (+10)
• Special equipment, 149 (0)

Above: First responders look for survivors of a drone attack on a residential building in Kyiv. (New York Times)

• Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate Chief, Major General Kyrylo Budanov stated that Russian forces have stopped targeting Ukraine’s military infrastructure, instead aiming for civilian infrastructure to incite panic and fear in Ukrainians..
• Over the past 24 hours, the enemy has launched missile and air strikes on the infrastructure and homes of the civilian population, violating the norms of International Humanitarian Law, the laws and customs of war.
• In general, during the previous day, the occupiers launched 3 rocket and 12 air strikes, carried out more than 60 MLRS attacks.
• Objects of civil infrastructure in the settlements of Vuhledar and Neskuchne of the Donetsk oblast, Nova Kamianka of the Kherson oblast and Mykolaiv were hit by enemy attacks.
• The situation in the Volyn and Polissya directions has not changed significantly. There is still a threat of missile and air strikes against the critical infrastructure of our State from the territory of the republic of belarus, including the use of iranian-made attack UAVs.
• The enemy shelled in such directions:
  • in the Siversky direction – from mortars and barrel artillery, in the areas of Senkivka settlements of Chernihiv oblast and Rozhkovychi, Sosnivka and Velyka Pysarivka of Sumy oblast.
  • in the Slobozhansky direction – from tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery, in the areas of Veterynarne, Vilkhuvatka, Vovchansk, Dvorichna, Kamyanka, Krasne, Starytsa, Strilecha, Khatne and Chuhunivka settlements of the Kharkiv oblast;
  • in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions – from tanks and artillery, in the areas of the settlements of Kislivka in the Kharkiv oblast, Nevske and Stelmakhivka in the Luhansk oblast, Berestove, Zarichne, Terny, Torske and Yampolivka in Donetsk oblast;
  • in the Bakhmut direction – from tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery in the areas of Andriivka, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Bilohorivka, Vesele, Ivanhrad, Kurdyumivka, Mayorsk, Opytne, Soledar and Yakovlivka settlements of the Donetsk oblast;
  • in the Avdiivka direction – from tanks and artillery of various calibers, in the areas of Vodyane, Krasnohorivka, Maryinka and Pervomaiske settlements;
  • in the Novopavlivka and Zaporizhzhia directions – from tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery, in the areas of the settlements of Vremivka, Vuhledar, Neskuchne, Novosilka, Pavlivka of the Donetsk oblast and Zeleny Hay, Novoandriivka, Olhivske, Stepove, Chervone and Shcherbaki of the Zaporizhzhia oblast.
• More than 20 settlements were damaged by fire in the Southern Buh direction. Among them are Bilohirka, Davydiv Brid, Myrne, Sukhyi Stavok and Ternovi Pody.

Above: Residents of recently liberated Kupyansk, Kharkiv, receive food aid and connect to internet on Starlink network. (New York Times)

• The Ukrainian General Staff reported Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast along the Kharkiv-Belgorod Oblast border near Zemlyanky and Chuhunivka on October 24.

Above: Damaged building in recently liberated Izyum, Donetsk.  (New York Times)

• The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured Karmazynivka, Miasozharivka, and Nevske in Luhansk Oblast and Novosadove in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces lost territory near Bakhmut on October 24. Geolocated footage posted on October 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recaptured a concrete factory on the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut, 2.5km east of Bakhmut’s city center.
• Wagner Group financer Yevgeny Prigozhin acknowledged the slow pace of Wagner Group ground operations around Bakhmut on October 23 as Russian forces continued to lose ground near the city. Prigozhin stated that Wagner forces advance only 100-200m per day and made the absurd claim that this slow pace is normal for modern warfare.

Above: Enemy soldiers guard the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant on the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. (Sky News)

Map via ISW

• Russian forces are likely preparing to defend Kherson City and are not fully withdrawing from upper Kherson Oblast despite previously confirmed reports of some Russian elements withdrawing from upper Kherson.
• A Russian occupation official announced the closure of the entrances to Kherson City and western Kherson Oblast until further notice.
• Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces are creating territorial defense units with Kherson City residents, but these units are unlikely to be an effective defensive force.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Russian security forces released most inmates from Kherson City’s prison and that Russian forces may use these men for the defense of Kherson City.
• The Russian position in upper Kherson Oblast is, nevertheless, likely untenable; and Ukrainian forces will likely capture upper Kherson Oblast by the end of 2022.
• Occupation administration officials have taken down communications systems in Kherson City in an attempt to limit civilian reporting on Russian positions to Ukrainian forces ahead of anticipated Ukrainian advances.
• Kherson Occupation Administration Deputy Head Kirill Stremousov claimed on October 24 that civilians forced to leave Kherson City and other areas of Kherson Oblast west of the Dnipro are eligible to receive a one-time payment of 100,000 rubles (1,632 USD) and a certificate to support the purchase of housing elsewhere.
• Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian forces have not yet laid enough explosives to fully destroy the Nova Kakhovka hydro-power plant dam as of October 24.
• Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate Chief Major General Kyrylo Budanov observed that the Russians have prepared parts of the dam for limited explosions that would not unleash the full force of the reservoir’s waters. The Russians may seek to damage the top portion of the dam, including the road that runs across it, to prevent the Ukrainians from following after retreating Russian forces if and when the Russians abandon the western bank of the Dnipro River.
• Ukrainian forces continued targeting Russian force concentrations near the Zaporizhia Oblast front line on October 23–24 and struck a Russian force and equipment concentration in the vicinity of Enerhodar on October 22.
• Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces fired on Zaporizhzhia City, Mykolaiv City, Nikopol, and Marhanets on October 23 and 24 with S-300 missiles and MLRS.

Retreating enemy is cutting communications cables in Kherson to prevent communications with civilians

Russians are breaking all communication cables in Kherson, they want to leave the city without communication. pic.twitter.com/KN5DwAN4Ld

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) October 24, 2022